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Waldemar Wojtasik
Parliamentary elections in Poland 1989—2011
Abstract: Parliamentary elections, which are shaping the sphere of political competition and 
the structure of the party system, have been held in Poland since 1989. The article shows the 
evolution of the system of elections to the parliament and its impact on the institutionalization 
of the party system. The current shape of the election system proves that the party system is 
stable both in terms of the sustainability of party entities and the standards of political competi‑
tion in the election arena. Elections are also a factor which consolidates party leadership in the 
case of the major political groups. This is particularly visible after Poland’s accession to the 
European Union. The evolution of the process of gaining political relevance by new political 
parties is also observed. Following 2001, only one new political party was able to win parlia‑
mentary representation.
Keywords: Parliamentary elections in Poland, Polish party system, electoral competition, 
Donald Tusk, Jarosław Kaczyński 
Introduction
A key element in the transformation of political life in Poland was the 
introduction of free and competitive parliamentary elections. In the case of 
domestic democratisation processes, the transition from party nomination to 
the election of the main powers of the state in general elections is considered 
as the most spectacular example of the political transformation of the Polish 
political scene.1 During communist rule, electoral competition during elec‑
tions to the parliament was not permitted since the very inception of the 
electoral procedure, that is at the stage of formulating the electoral procedure, 
1 E. Ziel i ńsk i: “Przekształcenia polityczno -ustrojowe w Polsce.” In: Transformacja 
ustrojowa państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Ed. Idem. Warszawa 1996, p. 32.
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as it did not allow everybody to run in the elections, but admitted only those 
entities, which were associated with the ruling powers. Deprived of the pos‑
sibility of making an actual choice and deciding only between persons who 
received acceptance of the regime, the voters legitimised the regime itself 
and the persons listed in the electoral registers (conscious electoral absentee‑
ism or refusal to cast a vote were forms of protest against the regime). The 
decision to restore a bicameral parliament model, though it alluded to politi‑
cal tradition, also derived from the nature of the political contract signed 
as a result of the Round Table talks between the regime and the democratic 
opposition. Fully free elections to the senate were only a taste of the future 
pluralism to come and they served as an alibi to conduct the “contract elec‑
tions” to the parliament, the result of which (as it then seemed) was supposed 
to ensure the regime’s maintenance of power. 
Electoral system
The circumstances under which the legal framework for parliamentary 
elections in Poland has been developed could have had a considerable impact 
on the frequent changes in this respect taking place in the future, especial‑
ly in the case of parliamentary elections. According to A. Antoszewski has 
stated, “the most apparent feature of the process of development of electoral 
democracy in Poland, is the extraordinary instability of the system of parlia‑
mentary elections. Out of the five parliamentary elections which took place 
in the years 1989—2001, only two were carried out using the same electoral 
law.”2 If we are to add the changes which took place in this respect after 
2001, we will obtain a picture of an exceptional level of instability of the pro‑
cedure for electing MPs to the parliament. Wojciech Sokół draws attention 
to yet another aspect of instability of the electoral law in Poland. It includes 
amendments of the basic law. The first two parliamentary elections (1989 and 
1991) took place in the period when the revised Constitution of 1952 was in 
force. The election law of 1993 was adopted when the so -called Mała Konsty‑
tucja (The Small Constitution) of 17 October 1992 was in place. The election 
system of 2001 and the election code passed in 2011 were formed within the 
legal framework of the Constitution of 2 April 1997.3 
2 A. A ntoszewsk i: “Ewolucja systemu wyborczego do Sejmu.” In: Demokratyzacja 
w III Rzeczypospolitej. Ed. Idem. Wrocław 2002, p. 51.
3 W. Sokó ł: Geneza i ewolucja systemów wyborczych w państwach Europy Środkowej 
i Wschodniej. Lublin 2007, p. 263.
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A certain counterweight in this respect was the senate electoral proce‑
dure that, despite going through particular evolution, seems not very remote 
from the one in force during the first election (1989). Both politically and 
systemically the smaller importance of the senate may be among of the rea‑
sons why pressure for introducing temporary changes, the intentions which 
would result from the current political calculations, was not that pronounced. 
In contrast to the Sejm, elections, regulations concerning elections to the 
senate did not undergo frequent changes. One of the reasons for such a situa‑
tion is the fact that the procedure adopted in 1989 ensured freedom of choice. 
In 1991, when discussion on the new procedure of elections to the senate was 
ripe, the upper chamber of parliament opposed it, and it was not until 2001 
that significant changes were made, apart from resignation of the requirement 
for an absolute majority. Up until 1997, Poland was divided into 49 elec‑
toral constituencies which overlapped with the provincial boundaries, and 
in each of which 2 or 3 senators were elected. The new administrative divi‑
sion, which resulted in the implementation of 16 provinces, forced a change 
to the number of election districts, which, starting from 2001, amounts to 
40 of (from 2 to 4 senators per province). The new election code introduced 
single -member districts in the elections to the senate, which was supposed to 
change the tendency prevalent at that time, to vote for candidates of political 
parties or candidates who had the support of political parties. This, however, 
did not happen, and in the 2011 elections, the candidates of the two major 
political parties won again.4
Adoption of the arrangements made with regard to the procedure of con‑
ducting parliamentary elections in 1989, stopped the democratisation mecha‑
nism halfway, and the need to implement democratic changes to the full in 
the future had become apparent. The procedure of elections to the parliament 
of 1989 was used only once, as the consecutive elections held in the future 
were conducted in a different political setting. The 1989 election law was 
invented for the needs of only one election, as the subsequent one, planned 
for 1993, was to be held based on completely different principles, without 
deciding if a majority or proportionate model will be applied.5 In addition, 
the need to complete the democratisation processes meant that in the near 
future there would be a need to change the election law for the elections to 
the parliament and replace it with a procedure that would be in line with 
democratic standards. 
The term of then proceeding parliament was shortened on the basis of 
a provision included in the revised Constitution of 7 April 1989. According 
4 R. Glajca r: “Polityczne konsekwencje zmiany systemu wyborczego do Senatu RP 
w 2011 roku.” In: Wybory parlamentarne 2011. Eds. A.  Tu rska,  W. Wojt asi k.  Katowice 
2012, pp. 61—78.
5 A. A ntoszewsk i: “Ewolucja systemu wyborczego…,” p. 57.
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to the new election law, there was to be a contractual division of seats in 
parliament and entirely free elections to the restored upper chamber were 
to be held. As many as 60% of MPs seats were reserved for the PZPR -ZSL-
SD coalition, 5% of seats were handed over to the Christian -Social Union 
(UChS), the Polish Social -Catholic Union (PZKS) and the PAX association 
party. The regime coalition could submit the national election register, the 
size of which could not exceed 10% of the overall number of MPs. However, 
35% of the seats in the parliament were to be chosen on the basis of free 
elections, in which candidates, who were put forward by independent citizen 
groups of at least 3,000 citizens, could run. Completely free elections to the 
senate were to be held in single -member districts, which employed the abso‑
lute majority rule, with the possibility to revote. In each of the 49 provinces, 
two senators were elected, with the exception of the Warsaw and Katowice 
provinces, in which 3 seats were chosen. Also, over 50% of valid votes had 
to be won by MP candidates, while in the second round of the elections, 
when two candidates with the most votes contended with each other, a simple 
majority sufficed to win. Such a method of electing MPs was to ensure the 
victory for those allied with the ruling regime, as it warranted almost 2/3 of 
all seats. On the other hand, it could have also brought victory to the opposi‑
tion, especially if the result was to be treated in the categories of achieving 
absolute support (and not through the prism of the seats won). The detailed 
election law provisions ensured that the elections would be held per a model 
similar to the absolute majority system combined with single ‑member elec‑
tion districts (in the case of the Sejm the size of the election region ranged 
from 2 to 5).6
The elections of 1991 were held in a different political environment. The 
adopted election law featured a high level of proportionality, constituting 
a combination of solutions catering to smaller sized parties. The elections of 
1991 were supposed to provide a real image of the Polish political scene by 
“quantifying” the actual power structure, determining the “actual scope of 
social support for the particular groups” and electing “a broad and adequate 
representation capable of fulfilling the functions of the constituent.”7 Such 
assumptions catered to the expectations of the weaker political powers which 
wanted to use the mechanism of the first fully free elections to the Sejm in 
order to install their political representation. Increasing the size of electoral 
districts (from 7 to 17 seats), adoption of a formula for calculating votes into 
seats, which benefitted smaller political parties, and simplifying the registra‑
tion of electoral lists in the whole country, led to the expectation that the 
elected parliamentary representation would be very fragmented as a result of 
6 Ibidem, p. 56.
7 Ibidem, p. 61. 
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the elections to come. The basic assumption of the election law was plurali‑
sation of the sphere of politics, which was to ensure transition from a major‑
ity to a proportional system. The relative simplicity in registering candidate 
lists resulted in 111 electoral committees running in the elections. Thanks 
to such a solution, it was possible to provide quite an accurate reflection of 
the electoral preferences at the parliamentary level. The election law did not 
introduce any thresholds at the national level. Instead, 69 seats were guaran‑
teed to parties, which achieved at least 5% of votes on the national level, or 
which won seats in at least 5 electoral districts. A modified variation of the 
Hare -Niemeyer method was used to count the votes in the districts, whereas 
the Sainte -Laguë method was used to calculate votes in the case of nation‑
wide electoral registers. The formula, in principle, gave preference to smaller 
political groups, which later led to the significant political fragmentation of 
the Sejm.8 
The subsequent amendment of the election law was marked by contra‑
dictory intentions. It was passed on 28 May 1993 as a document, which in 
its assumptions, was supposed to counteract excessive fragmentation of the 
Sejm through the utilization of concentration -favouring mechanisms. Four 
years after the 1989 elections, the party system and the main political parties 
were supposed to be mature enough to desire and to be able to submit them‑
selves to such a concentration process. A factor which was decisive to this 
intention was the instability of the executive elected by the Sejm, together 
with the cabinet of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, all of them functioned for no more 
than a dozen or so months. It was decided that the solution to this state of 
affairs was to decrease the number of political parties in the Sejm. For this 
very reason the elections were carried out based on an altered election law, 
whose provisions aimed to alleviate some of the negative consequences of 
the previous election, that is the excessive fragmentation of the parliament. 
The change that took place involved replacement of the extreme proportional 
formula with a moderately proportional one.9 It catered especially to larger 
parties, which resulted from the introduction of statutory election thresholds: 
5% for parties, 8% for coalitions and 7% for the national election register, 
increasing the number of electoral districts from 37 to 52 and decreasing the 
lower threshold of the possible seats in one district from 7 to 3. As a result, 
the average size of an electoral district decreased from 10.57 in 1991 to 7.52 
8 See S. Gebeth ner: “Sejm rozczłonkowany: wytwór ordynacji wyborczej czy 
polaryzacji na polskiej scenie politycznej?” In: Wybory ’91 a polska scena polityczna. Eds. 
S. Gebeth ner,  J.  Racibor sk i.  Warszawa 1992, pp. 51—55. 
9 R. Wisz n iowsk i: “Wybory parlamentarne w krajach Europy Środkowo -Wschodniej. 
Polityczne konsekwencje systemów wyborczych.” In: Demokracje Europy Środkowo‑
Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej. Eds. A. A ntoszewsk i,  R .  Herbut. Wrocław 
1998, p. 91.
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in 1993.10 The d’Hondt method was used to calculate votes into seats, which 
favoured middle -sized and large groups. As it later turned out, this move had 
a key impact on the determination of the number of seats of the victorious 
parties.
The subsequent parliamentary elections took place in 1997 pursuant to 
the same election law setting, which remained in the exactly the same form 
as that introduced four years earlier. This was the first case after 1989 when 
the rules of the election game were preserved and allowed for parties to par‑
ticipate in a proven and familiar framework. This does not, however, mean 
that the attempts to amend it were not made in the course of the term, which 
was the case during Lech Wałęsa’s term in office when he came forward with 
such an initiative or when the Labour Union (UP) was in power (attempt to 
introduce the Sainte -Laguë method). A factor which, it seems, had a deci‑
sive impact on the maintenance of the existing provisions, was the interest 
of political parties (especially that of the SLD) which were present in the 
Sejm at that time. All three of the major groups (apart from the mentioned 
SLD, PSL, and UW — the successor of the UD) were hoping that a similar 
mechanism would be used to that of 4 years earlier, when they achieved an 
extraordinarily high percentage of seats compared to the votes they actually 
received (overrepresentation of seats).
Before the elections of 2001, a correction was made to the provisions of 
the election law. In changing the election law, the remaining parties present 
in the Sejm saw an opportunity to block the domination of SLD in parlia‑
ment when the party was about to obtain decisive majority and rule alone. 
In these conditions, work was begun on passing a new election law, which 
the Sejm eventually adopted on 12 April 2001. The second factor, in par‑
ticular, was a catalyst for actions aiming to change the election law, which 
was then in place. Part of them (e.g. the change of the method for calculating 
votes into seats) was motivated by the political interest of those in power, 
which prompted a change of the expected victory of SLD by using a method 
for calculating votes into seats, a solution which favoured smaller parties. 
The necessity to change the election law before the following elections also 
resulted from the local ‑government reform and the new administrative divi‑
sion of the country,11 especially in the facet of changing the borders of the 
electoral districts, which was the consequence of the creation of new coun‑
ties (Pol. powiat — a second -level administrative unit) and of the decrease in 
10 R. Glajca r,  J.  Ok rzesi k,  W. Wojt a si k: Ustrój polityczny RP. Wprowadzenie. 
Bielsko -Biała 2005, p. 32.
11 K. Skot n ick i: “Ogólna charakterystyka trybu uchwalenia i postanowień ordynacji 
wyborczej do Sejmu RP i do Senatu RP z 12 kwietnia 2001 r.” Przegląd Sejmowy 2001, 
No. 4. p. 74.
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the number of provinces.12 The main changes proposed and accepted in the 
election law contradicted those introduced eight years before. The sizes of 
the electoral districts were increased, while their number were decreased and 
seven to 19 MPs were elected in each of them. Instead of the d’Hondt method 
introduced in 1993, which favoured large political groups in the process of 
allocating seats, the Sainte -Laguë method was introduced (in a modified ver‑
sion, with the first divisor being 1.4) which was a more proportionate reflec‑
tion of the electoral preferences at the level of the seats granted, and which 
as a consequence could destroy the advantage of large political groups. The 
national election register, which allowed for additional seats to be awarded to 
those parties which achieved significant support on a national scale, was also 
made redundant. Taking into consideration the pre -election polls, the only 
party that could be at a loss as a result of the changes, was SLD.
The 2005 elections featured a reintroduction of the d’Hondt method, 
which was used in place of the modified Sainte -Laguë method, as a formula 
for calculating votes into seats.13 In contrast to the previous change, which 
was made shortly before the elections of 2001, this was one of the first moves 
of SLD, then the ruling party, and introduced on 26 July 2002. These actions 
were motivated by a short -sighted hope that the support achieved could only 
increase for SLD (since this was actually the case as in each of the consecu‑
tive elections after 1991, SLD achieved a better result) and it would be this 
very party which would benefit from the change in the provisions during the 
next election. However, the outcome was quite the opposite, and as a result 
of the use of the d’Hondt method, the dwindling support for SLD led to the 
loss of a certain amount of seats. Two post -Solidarity formations, namely 
PiS and PO, benefitted from the change. The initiated change of the method 
for calculating votes was figuratively referred to by Rafał Glajcar as SLD’s 
political “own goal.” 
The political haughtiness and calculation, which made SLD introduce this 
change (as the party was expecting to be the main beneficiary of the change 
in the following elections), was punished and worked for the benefit of the 
political competitors of SLD.14 
The last significant change introduced into the election law was passing 
of the election code. Work on its draft version finished with its presentation 
in the lower house of parliament on 1 December 2010. Two days later, the 
12 A. P ia seck i: Wybory 1989—2002. Parlamentarne, samorządowe, prezydenckie. 
Zielona Góra 2003, p. 87.
13 W. Sokó ł: “Ewolucja systemów wyborczych do Sejmu po 1989 r.” In: Dwadzieścia 
lat demokratyzacji systemu politycznego RP. Eds. A.  A ntoszewsk i,  R .  Herbut. Lublin 
2011, p. 202.
14 R. Glajca r,  J.  Ok rzesi k ,  W. Wojt asi k : Ustrój polityczny RP. Wprowadzenie…, 
p. 37.
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bill was read for the third time and concluded with an undisputed vote, by 
which the election code was passed. 
The corrections to the draft made by the Senate were revised a month 
later, and on 5 January 2011, the Sejm finally passed the new election law. 
Its provisions, in the first place, organised into one whole the election regula‑
tions, which were scattered all over various legal acts. Apart from making 
a synthesis all of the previously applicable elections laws, the code intro‑
duced a series of changes in the election method, of which the following are 
the most important from the perspective of parliamentary elections: passing 
of a quota system in the election registers and introduction of single -member 
districts to the senate.
Elections
The first parliamentary elections were held after the transformation took 
place on 4 June 1989. They were “opening elections,” referred to also as 
“transition” or “founding” elections, and they served to grant citizens their 
basic political freedoms (mainly the freedom of political expression and the 
right for the citizens to organize themselves for political purposes).15 The 
1989 elections can be characterised by means of the political consequences of 
the applied election law. The key consequences include: 1) lack of full com‑
petition and determination of the division of seats on the basis of a political 
contract; 2) ephemerality of the election law — it was passed for the purpos‑
es of only one election; 3) competition of a large number of independent can‑
didates, who were not associated with any political party or quasi -party (e.g. 
Solidarity); 4) the possibility to speak out against the existing system without 
actually leading to the removal of any of the elements of power, but with the 
opportunity to grant power to a politically significant number of anti -system 
representatives.16 Despite the fact that the laws of election to the Sejm and the 
senate were passed in a rush and featured certain shortcomings,17 they were 
a step forward towards introducing democratic election laws. Apart from the 
15 Further on this topic A. A ntoszewsk i: “Wzorce rywalizacji na arenie wyborczej.” 
In: Systemy polityczne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Perspektywa porównawcza. Ed. 
Idem. Wrocław 2006, pp. 77—80.
16 A. A ntoszewsk i: “System wyborczy i wybory parlamentarne po 1989 roku.” In: 
Polityka w Polsce w latach 90. Wybrane problemy. Eds. A. A ntoszewsk i,  R .  Herbut. 
Wrocław 1999, pp. 79—80. 
17 A. Żu kowsk i: “Ewolucja ordynacji wyborczych do parlamentu RP.” In: Partie 
i system partyjny III RP. Eds. K. Kowalcz yk. Toruń 2011, p. 310.
76 Systemy polityczne
undemocratic, quota -based division of seats to the Sejm, they were the first 
example of such solutions being introduced in the countries of the Eastern 
Block.18
The established election date significantly shortened the length of the elec‑
tion campaign and restricted the room for manoeuvre of both sides of the polit‑
ical competition had. In this short period, both the solidarity and the regime 
side had to form a stance with regard to the political situation which had 
unfolded, and in light of the development, elaborate an election programme, 
which would ensure them social support. According to the agreements made, 
the elections were to be non -confrontational. However, it was difficult to reach 
the minds of the disoriented majority of voters without referring to the nega‑
tivities of the other option. An obvious consequence of the elections was the 
Sejm, in which the majority of seats fell into the hands of the communist 
coalition. In reality, however, it was the opposition that had the majority of 
social support, as 16.5 million Poles voted for 161 members of the “Solidar‑
ity” Citizens Committee, which corresponded to a total of 63% of the voters. 
A supreme example of the support expressed for the candidates of the Soli‑
darity opposition, was its obvious triumph in the senate, in which not a single 
member of the regime won a seat. As many as 99 seats went to the candidates 
of Solidarity, whereas the remaining one was taken by Henryk Stokłosa, a for‑
mally independent candidate, who was, however, connected with the regime.19 
The results of the elections to the Contract Sejm, even though they formal‑
ly guaranteed majority for the regime, revealed actual opposition of society 
towards real socialism. The results came as a big surprise to the regime that 
was not prepared for such a turn of events. This was the result of its overesti‑
mation of its own capabilities, at the same time underestimating those of the 
opposition and a complete inability to understand the prevalent social climate 
(connected with failing to understand the consequences of the election law).20
The first entirely free parliamentary elections took place in 1991. They 
were first intended to be held as late as 1993, however, they were resched‑
uled to take place earlier. Several causes are given to why that was the case. 
Firstly, it was necessary to conduct further structural changes, severing ties 
with the heritage of the communist past. Secondly, a new political setup 
had come to exist, with President Lech Wałęsa, whose legitimacy was much 
stronger to that of the Contract Sejm. The Sejm was becoming an institution 
which was incapable of acting in the new democratic realm being formed 
and which was even further divided and conflicted.21 The international 
18 Ibidem, p. 310.
19 A. Dudek: Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej 1989—1995. Kraków 1997, p. 49.
20 A.K. P ia seck i: Wybory 1989—2002…, p. 24.
21 T. God lewsk i: Polski system polityczny. Instytucje — procedury — obywatele. 
Toruń 2005, p. 36.
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context was also crucial here, since it pointed to the domestic Sejm as the 
only parliament which did not have a fully democratic mandate compared 
to other Central -European states.22 In the case of elections to the senate it 
could be observed that despite a different election law, the result of the elec‑
tions turned out to be similar to the parliamentary elections. The specificity 
of the initial stages of democratic transformation resulted in the majority 
system failing to lead to a significant reduction of the number of politi‑
cal groups, whose representatives received seats in the senate. The political 
fragmentation of the upper house of parliament resembled that of the Sejm. 
The election results attest to the fact that the Senate was elected primarily 
as a representation of the main political groups,23 while hopes that it would 
play a civic or self -government role turned out to be a misjudgement. The 
Democratic Union (21 seats), Solidarity (11 seats) and the Centre Agreement 
(PC), Catholic Election Action (WAK) and the Polish People’s Party (all 
received 9 seats each) won the most seats. A peculiarity was the weak result 
of SLD (4 seats), despite it winning second place in the elections to the 
Sejm. The above statistics show that the elections to the senate took place 
along the same lines of party competition as the elections to the Sejm, and 
the differences in the election formulas to both the chambers of parliament 
did not lead to different standards of election behaviour. The only significant 
difference, according to Stanisław Gebethner, was the level of deformation, 
which became apparent in the elections to the senate. It was the result of 
the election system, which was based on the principle of relative majority in 
unequal electoral districts.24 
The subsequent parliamentary elections also did not take place at the date 
defined in the constitution. It resulted from political weakness of the regime 
elected in the previous election, the development of relations between the 
institutions of the political executive, and also because of the social exhaus‑
tion of the transformation process, especially the results of economic reforms. 
There was no political stabilisation in the Sejm, the institutionalisation of 
political entities progressed at an unsatisfactory speed, and the functioning 
government coalitions were torn by struggles and conflict. The necessary 
system reforms were hindered by the conflicts between President Lech Wałęsa 
and the consecutive prime ministers (Jan Olszewski, Hanna Suchocka) and 
22 R. A lber sk i,  W. Jed naka: “Wybory prezydenckie i parlamentarne — jedność czy 
różnorodność funkcji politycznych?” In: Ewolucja polskiego systemu politycznego po 1989 
roku w świetle komparatystycznej teorii polityki. Ed. A. A ntoszewsk i. Wrocław 1998, 
p. 73.
23 S. Gebeth ner: “System wyborczy: deformacja czy reprezentacja?” In: Wybory par‑
lamentarne 1991 i 1993. Ed. Idem. Warszawa 1995, p. 40.
24 S. Gebeth ner: “Wybory do Senatu.” In: Polska scena polityczna a wybory. Ed. 
Idem. Warszawa 1993, p. 203.
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governments. In these conditions, there was a social and political expectation 
for a new political setup.25
Experience gained in the 1991 elections and the functioning of the par‑
liament, which was elected resultantly, led to the commencement of work 
on changing the election law. The elections, as a result of grave public dis‑
content, led to the defeat of post -Solidarity formations (in terms of the seats 
won and not the aggregate support). In analysing the results of the elections 
to the Sejm, it can be concluded that according to intention, it was possible 
to avoid significant political fragmentation of the composition of the lower 
house. The results of the election to the senate, as previously, were a reflec‑
tion of the support expressed for parties running in the parliamentary elec‑
tions, however, the impact of the formula of relative majority was noted. As 
a consequence, the two victorious groups won almost 3/4 of the seats, leaving 
the other parties with only a handful of mandates. This model of overrepre‑
sentation of the triumphant groups was to become a rule in the subsequent 
elections to the upper house.
The next elections took place on a constitutionally fixed date after 
expiry of the four -year term, the first such instance in the history of the 
Third Polish Republic. The lesson learnt by the voters (and the politicians 
of the defeated parties) four years earlier caused a less pronounced reforma‑
tion of the parliament this time. The electorate drew conclusions and the 
voters were more tactical in their electoral decisions. This, in part, hap‑
pened thanks to a change in the logic of action of political parties, which 
put forward much fewer electoral committees, avoiding thus a scattering of 
support.26 A serious change took place in terms of the nature of electoral 
competition, as small united right -wing formations, which had made an 
alliance under the wings of Solidarity, ran against SLD. This “electoral 
bonus for unity” allowed them not only to win the elections, but to create, 
along with UW, a cabinet with a stable majority in the Sejm. This was 
possible in light of the complete defeat of the ruling coalition, as was the 
case four years earlier, but with much stronger support for SLD. In the case 
of the elections to the senate, two of the largest committees once again 
received over 3/4 of seats of which AWS won twice as many as SLD. PSL 
suffered a defeat this time and its number of senators fell over tenfold from 
36 to just 3. This should be viewed in light of a return to the right propor‑
tions (resulting from actual public support), as four years earlier, PSL party 
members, along with SLD, were the main beneficiaries of the defeat of the 
right -wing parties. 
25 R. Ch r uściak: “Prace nad ordynacją wyborczą do Sejmu i wybory parlamentarne 
w 1993 r.” In: Polski system polityczny w okresie transformacji. Eds. R. Ch r uściak, 
T.  Mołdawa,  K .A.  Wojt a szcz yk,  E .  Ziel i ńsk i. Warszawa 1995, pp. 263—264.
26 A. P ia seck i: Wybory 1989—2002…, p. 69.
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Preparations for the 2001 elections took place in the shadow of the politi‑
cal marginalisation of the ruling political groups (first the AWS–UW coali‑
tion, followed by the minority AWS government) and the growing support for 
SLD. The elections brought about the victory of the opposition SLD, which 
was able to increase support for its group considerably compared to 1997. 
The pre -election poll predictions spoke even about the possibility of garner‑
ing an absolute majority by SLD, which would allow them to independently 
form a cabinet. The unfortunate ending of the campaign (e.g. Marek Belka’s 
comment on the social costs of the reform) resulted in the need for PSL to 
participate in forming the government of Leszek Miller. Two formations, PO 
and PiS, emerged out of AWS. They won parliamentary representation and 
paved their way through to domination in the party system to come. Atten‑
tion also needs to be drawn to the fact that there appeared a few groups, 
which were genetically not akin to the main political trends of the times. 
The Self -Defence Party (Pol. Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families 
(LPR) were parties of protest, and their success was also made possible by 
support received from the electorate which was opposed to Poland’s future 
integration with the European Union.
The 2005 parliamentary elections were held again in the constitutional 
timeframe, and as previously, the first coalition did not survive until the end 
— first PSL left the government, and then in 2004 Marek Belka replaced 
Leszek Miller as a prime minister. The changes being described also prove 
the political downfall of SLD, which was gradually losing social support, as 
confirmed by its defeat in the elections to the European Parliament in 2004. 
The election was thus not only a test of the level of support for the particu‑
lar parties, but was also perceived as a battle for survival of the left -side’s 
hegemon. Paradoxically, the result of the elections can be interpreted both 
as a continuation and as a qualitative change of the previous election. It was 
a continuation in the sense that the same committees put forward their MP 
candidates, which was indicative of a certain stabilisation of the sphere of 
politics and the party system. On the other hand, the defeat of SLD (up until 
then SLD received increasingly better results in every consecutive election) 
was seen as the beginning of a reconstruction of the parliamentary political 
competition scene, in which SLD had been the key subject (due to the constant 
support it received and the institutional stability it represented). Compared to 
the previous elections, the increase of support for post -Solidarity formations 
is worth taking note of. It was them who were the main beneficiaries of the 
decreased support for SLD. What is more, both of them ran in the elections 
with a pre -election declaration that they would form a single cabinet, which 
made political competition between them take a specific shape. The growth 
of support was also influenced by the presidential elections, in which the two 
favourites (Lech Kaczyński and Donald Tusk) were nominated by PiS and 
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PO. Eventually, the party of the Kaczyński brothers won both the elections, 
and PO was left with having to observe how PiS is taking over complete 
power in the country. Their victory was one of the key factors which polar‑
ised the political scene. The vision of social and political reality presented by 
the party of Jarosław Kaczyński became the subject of political discourse, 
which drew clear division lines within the political class.27 
Though the subsequent parliamentary elections were planned for 2009, 
the resulting political situation led to them being held faster than planned 
(and the surprise of the political class of having to actually hold them, could 
have been one of the causes of why no real changes to the election law were 
made). The main axis of the conflict in the 2007 elections was a dispute 
between PO and PiS, which within two years, transformed from being poten‑
tial allies and coalition members, to opponents battling their way through in 
an open political struggle. The elections resembled a plebiscite evaluating 
the government of PiS, with a clearly outlined alternative in the form of PO. 
In a situation of a dichotomous division of the sphere of politics, the sig‑
nificance of smaller parties fell, among which SLD and PSL only slightly 
improved their results compared to the previous elections, and where parties, 
providing political support for PiS, suffered a defeat. Neither LPR nor the 
Self -Defence Party passed the election threshold to enter into parliament and, 
what is more, they also failed to qualify for funding from the state budget. In 
such circumstances, the number of political parties in parliament fell to the 
lowest level in the history of the Third Polish Republic. 
Based on the regulations of the electoral code, the most recent parlia‑
mentary elections were held in 2011, which wrapped up the parliament’s full 
term. The mentioned four-year period, though three elections were held in 
this time (to the EP, presidential elections and local -government elections), 
was characterised by relative stability of support for the main political par‑
ties. This period was marked by the consecutive victories of PO and its can‑
didate for president, stable support for PiS as the second political power, 
and relatively smaller support for the two remaining parliamentary groups. 
A system of two large and two smaller groups became established. They 
filled the space of political relevance and complemented each other, radically 
restricting the chances of other parties gaining support.28 The results of the 
2011 election can be viewed in two ways. First, significance is given to the 
aforementioned consequences for the observed stability of the parliamentary 
27 M. Jez i ńsk i: “Wybory parlamentarne: pomiędzy uniwersalizmem a partykularyz‑
mem.” In: Wybory parlamentarne 2005. Analiza marketingowa. Eds. R. Ch r uściak, 
T. Mołdawa ,  K.A. Wojt a szcz yk, E. Ziel i ńsk i. Toruń 2006, p. 31.
28 A. Tu rska  -Kawa: “Emocjonalny odbiór w poszczególnych elektoratach w wybo-
rach parlamentarnych 2011.” In: Wybory parlamentarne 2011. Eds. A. Tu r ska  -Kawa, 
W. Wojt asi k.  Katowice 2012, pp. 151—168.
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political competition arena. In this case, for the first time in 10 years, a new 
political entity, namely that of the Palikot’s Movement, had entered the Sejm 
independently. What is also worth mentioning, its genesis took place outside 
parliament, as it did not form as a result of its secession from another group, 
but was created from inception by a former MP of PO — Janusz Palikot. The 
second consequence of the elections was that the same government coalition 
and the same prime minister, Donald Tusk, had remained in power, which 
was the first time a situation like this had ever happened since the beginning 
of democratic transformation. What is worth noting is that all the parties 
in parliament, compared to the previous election, lost part of their support, 
which, however, did not inflict as much harm on them as previously. A fall in 
support for the governing parties did not result in their losing power and they 
were able to restore their cabinets, even though their parliamentary represen‑
tation dropped. The loss of support by PiS signified the gradual downfall of 
this group and gave the opponents of Jarosław Kaczyński arguments to ques‑
tion his leadership. SLD suffered a complete defeat which led to the loss of 
leadership by Grzegorz Napieralski.29
Conclusion
Several regularities are observed when analysing the influence of the par‑
liamentary elections on Polish politics over the last 25 years. The first of 
them involves stabilisation of the party system, both in terms of the reduc‑
tion of the number of parties with parliamentary representation, as well as 
in terms of the standards of political competition. Changes of the electoral 
system in elections to the Sejm, which were evolutionary in nature especially 
in the second period, were the basis for the processes of institutionalisation of 
the main political actors. It manifested itself in the adoption of such strategies 
by the political parties, which would provide them with repeatable election 
successes. It is also worth noting here that loss of parliamentary representa‑
tion resulted in each case with the marginalisation of the political entity. 
A second important consequence of the impact of parliamentary elections, 
is the creation of political leadership, which the elections themselves inspired. 
In contrast to the beginning of the 1990s, electoral institutionalisation of the 
emergence process of political leaders took place. At the beginning, also due 
to the instability of the political parties of that time, political leadership was 
29 W. Wojt a si k:  Funkcje wyborów w III Rzeczypospolitej. Teoria i praktyka. Katowice 
2012, p. 160.
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labile. Often times, especially in the case of right -wing political parties, their 
leaders were unable to ensure a long ‑lasting effect of their actions. The elec‑
tions conducted in the 21st century brought about the stabilisation of party 
leadership of the leaders of the biggest political parties. This also happened 
in the case of Jarosław Kaczyński, whose party came to lose more elections 
than it actually won.
It is also worth drawing attention to how new political parties acquired 
political relevance. The election system in place, in which election thresholds 
form an inseparable part in the elections to the Sejm, constitutes a factor 
which restricts the chances of other political groups of succeeding. The most 
recent significant change of the number of relevant parliamentary groups 
took place in 2001. Back then four new parties won representation in the 
Sejm as a result of the elections. From that point on, only once more in 2011, 
a new group (the Palikot’s Movement), achieved the minimum 5% threshold 
required and became a relevant player on the political scene. 
